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Relationship lending theory suggests that lenders in close proximity to their borrowers 
might be the most efficient providers of screening and monitoring services, because the 
cost of collecting information declines with distance.  In agreement with this theory, I 
present evidence that ties bank branch presence to borrower performance in the low-
income housing market. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks are experts in lending to informationally opaque borrowers because banks 
specialize in establishing long-term relationships with customers and collecting soft (i.e. 
information that is difficult to express in hard numbers, such as honesty and diligence) 
information about them.  This information allows banks to assess the creditworthiness of 
applicants who would not qualify for a loan if the decision was based solely on a credit 
score (Berger and Udell, 1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994).  In areas where informational 
opacity is a problem, the proximity of borrowers to the lender plays a crucial role in 
enhancing credit availability.  Proximity is important because the costs of collecting 
information come down with declining distance, and this affects availability and terms 
of credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Hauswald and Marquez, 
2006; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2006).  Ergungor (2006) extends the implications of this 
theory to the mortgage market for low-moderate income borrowers and finds that the 
presence of a bank branch in communities of low-moderate income is associated with 
greater access to home-purchase mortgages; namely, higher quantity and lower price. 
In this paper, I go one step further and look at the aftermath of relationship 
lending.  Do relationships make a difference in terms of loan performance?  For 
example, if relationships improve the effectiveness of the screening process before 
lending, and the bank continues to monitor the loan after origination, one would expect 
to observe a lower foreclosure rate (number of foreclosures per housing unit with a 
mortgage).1  Monitoring, in this case, would entail identifying any problems early on 
and renegotiating loan terms if necessary to avoid foreclosure, a process that entails 
substantial deadweight losses (Harding and Sirmans, 2002).  To the extent that 
information-collection costs decline with declining distance to the lender, the structure 
of the banking market in low-income areas should matter.  In this paper, I look for 
evidence that ties branch presence to borrower performance in the housing market.  The 
main question of the paper is: does bank-branch presence in low-income communities 
have an impact on home foreclosure rates? 
                                                           
1 Note that the number of foreclosures may increase with more lending.  However, the foreclosure rate may 
still decline.   2
I find that in Ohio, county-level foreclosure rates are negatively correlated with 
the presence of bank branches in the low-moderate income neighborhoods of the 
county.  Furthermore, I find that the distance between the branch and the community is 
important; the closer the branches are, the stronger is the effect on foreclosures. 
This paper is closely related to the literature of two research areas.  First, there is 
a rich literature in the area of real estate on the topics of mortgage defaults and 
foreclosures.  Using individual mortgage data, researchers have identified some of the 
characteristics of borrowers, loans, and markets that seem to have a significant effect on 
the probability of default, the probability of foreclosure given default, and the amount of  
loss given foreclosure (Avery et al., 1996; Ambrose and Capone, 1998; Phillips and 
VanderHoff, 2004; Capozza and Thomson, 2005).  Examples of each type of characteristic 
include whether or not borrowers are self-employed, the loan-to-value ratio of the 
mortgage, and the foreclosure laws of the state. Yet this literature has been quiet on the 
impact of the structure of the local lending market and the distance between borrowers 
and lenders on the foreclosure rates.  This paper is the first to tackle these issues. 
The other literature my paper is related to is the work on relationship lending.  
Small banks have long been recognized as an important supplier of credit to 
informationally opaque small businesses (Berger, Saunders, Scalise, and Udell, 1998; 
Peek and Rosengren, 1998, Strahan and Weston, 1998; Cole et al., 2004; Berger et al., 
2005).  The disappearance of a small bank from a market has been associated with 
increased use of expensive trade credit, but no long-term credit constraints have been 
found (Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999).  More recently, however, DeYoung, Glennon, and 
Nigro (2006) examined small business loan defaults and found that loan default 
probabilities increase with the distance to the lender.  In this paper, I provide further 
support for the relationship theory by confirming the importance, with respect to 
mortgage foreclosures, of bank presence and distance to the lender.  I also find that 
lender size is important.  My results are driven mainly by the presence of small banks 
(total assets less than $1 billion) in low-moderate income areas. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides the background 
for the analysis and presents the paper’s main hypothesis.  Section 3 describes the data. 
Section 4 explains the method.  Section 5 presents the results.  Section 6 concludes.   3
2. Background and Hypothesis 
The presence of a bank branch in low-moderate income neighborhoods is 
associated with more abundant lending (Ergungor, 2006).  The reason a branch presence 
is thought to make a difference is because banks specialize in lending to the 
informationally opaque borrowers that predominate in such neighborhoods. Credit 
score-based lending rules are often infeasible in these areas, where credit histories are 
tainted by past problems or simply nonexistent.  Estimates for these types of consumers 
vary between 10 and 22 million households (“Innovations in Personal Finance for the 
Unbanked: Emerging Practices from the Field”, Fannie Mae Foundation Case Studies, 
2003). 
The advantage banks have in such an environment comes from their ability to 
extract nonpublic information (referred to as soft information in this literature) about 
their customers from their multiple interactions with them (Berger, 1999; Degryse and 
Van Cayseele, 2000).  For example, Mester, Nakamura, and Renault (1998) find that 
commercial borrowers’ checking account transactions contain information that can be 
used to predict loan delinquencies.  Banks can use such information to screen potential 
borrowers (Allen, 1990; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984) and monitor them later on 
(Diamond, 1984; Gorton and Haubrich, 1987; Diamond, 1991; Winton, 1995; Gorton and 
Kahn, 2000).  Such screening and monitoring work to alleviate the incentive distortions 
caused by asymmetric information and increase the likelihood of efficient project 
continuations (Von Thadden, 1992). 
These principles that arise out of corporate finance studies may also apply to 
mortgage lending in low-moderate neighborhoods.  A bank could glean useful 
information about a customer’s creditworthiness from his transactions with the bank, 
such as how many checks he bounces every month, how many weeks he can go without 
using a payday loan, or how often he has to renegotiate the repayment schedule.  Armed 
with this information, the bank might weed out excessively poor credit risks beforehand, 
offer loan products tailored to the borrower’s needs, and if it is efficient to do so, avoid 
costly foreclosure by renegotiating the terms of the mortgage.   4
A major friction in this process, however, is information collection costs, and this 
is where the distance between the borrower and the lender becomes crucial.  Geographic 
proximity lowers the cost of collecting soft information (e.g., for communication and 
transportation), which has been shown to be related to the finding that loan applicants 
close to their lenders are more likely to be approved and less likely to default (Petersen 
and Rajan, 2002; Brevoort and Hannan, 2004; DeYoung et al 2006). 
The main hypothesis of this paper is based on the premise that soft information 
is important for screening and monitoring, and that lenders in close proximity to the 
borrower will be the most efficient providers of these services, because the cost of 
collecting information declines with distance.  Therefore, I expect to observe declining 
foreclosure rates when there are banks present in low-moderate income neighborhoods.  
Note that this not to mean that the number of foreclosures will decline.  As relationships 
generate more loans, a side effect might be an increase in the number of foreclosures.  
However, if the number of loans is increasing faster than foreclosures, the foreclosure 
rate may decline. 
Hypothesis 1: Foreclosure rates on housing loans to low-moderate income consumers 
will decline with increasing access to bank branches. 
The second hypothesis deals with the size of the banks that are physically 
present in the county.  The small-business-lending literature suggests that small banks 
have an advantage over larger lenders in originating relationship loans.  The source of 
their advantage is their organizational structure.  Stein (2002) and Berger et al. (2005) 
explain that in a large financial institution with a hierarchical structure, a loan officer 
does not have an incentive to invest in soft information collection because he cannot 
easily transmit this information to his superiors.  For example, a borrower’s character 
(honesty, hard work) cannot be expressed in hard numbers to justify to the upper 
management why capital must be allocated to that borrower.  Because the superiors---
who may be located in a different city---have to base their capital allocation decisions on 
hard information, they may refuse to allocate capital to the loan officer.  Anticipating 
that his efforts may go to waste, the loan officer does not invest in information collection 
in the first place.  At the other extreme, in a small organization with a perfectly 
decentralized structure, the loan officer is his own CEO and has more freedom to   5
allocate capital as he sees fit.  This gives him a greater incentive to invest in soft 
information collection.  The second hypothesis of the paper is based on small banks’ 
advantage in processing soft information. 
Hypothesis 2: Foreclosure rates will decline more rapidly with increasing access to 
small-bank branches rather than large-bank branches. 
3. Data Description   
I analyze the effect of bank-branch presence in low-moderate income 
neighborhoods on the foreclosure rates in Ohio’s 88 counties.  Admittedly, I do not 
know exactly in which income-level neighborhood the foreclosures have taken place.  
Yet it is not too farfetched to assume that they are more likely to occur in the lower-
income areas of the county.  Therefore, I expect to capture some correlation between 
branch presence in low-income areas and county-level foreclosures. 
All information related to census tract characteristics comes from the 2000 
Decennial Census.  Information related to the mortgages that were originated within a 
county, such as quantity and price, comes from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act  
(HMDA) Loan Application Register (LAR) data.  The addresses I use to determine 
where bank branches are located come from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits file.  In the 
remainder of this section, I will describe my data in greater detail. 
3.1 Foreclosures   
County-level foreclosure data come from the Ohio Supreme Court’s annual Ohio 
Courts Summary – Courts of Common Pleas General Division.  I collect this data for 
each year from 1999 to 2005.  The foreclosure rate for each county at year t, Forecloset, is 
the number of new foreclosure filings per owner-occupied housing unit with a 
mortgage.  The number of owner-occupied housing units with a mortgage is based on 
data from the 2000 Census.  The Census Bureau examines a sample of housing units in 
each county and reports the number of housing units with and without a mortgage.  
This gives a fraction of units with and without a mortgage that I assume is valid for the 
entire county.  Multiplying this fraction by the total number of owner-occupied housing   6
units in the county gives the total number of owner-occupied housing units in the county 
with a mortgage.  
3.2 Branch Presence   
Because my foreclosure data are at county level, I must create a county-level 
measure for the degree of bank branch presence in the low-income neighborhoods of the 
county, where a neighborhood is delineated by the census tract it is in.2  I begin by 
measuring the branch presence at census tract level for each census tract, then I 
aggregate it to county level.  In the following two sections I describe each step in detail. 
3.2.1 Branch Presence at Census Tract Level   
The FDIC’s Summary of Deposits file provides the branch addresses of every 
FDIC-insured institution in the country.  There were 3,886 bank branches in Ohio in 
1999.  Using CRAWiz, a geocoding software package, each address is matched to a 
latitude and longitude.  About 92 percent of the addresses match automatically; because 
of spelling errors or incomplete addresses, the rest must be matched manually.  For 
those, I search for the correct address on the Internet and replace the old address with 
the new one in CRAWiz.  If that fails, there are a few other alternatives.  If the address is 
an intersection, I can point to the intersection on the CRAWiz map, and the software will 
use the latitude and longitude of that point.  If there is ambiguity about the directional 
qualifier (e.g., North vs. South Main Street), I use Google satellite pictures to determine 
where the branch is located; for example, if 123 North Main Street is a residence and 123 
South Main Street is a business building, the branch is in the business building.  Using 
this method, I determine the location of every branch of FDIC-insured institutions in the 
state. 
To obtain a measure of branch presence in a census tract, I determine the 
distance of each branch to the census tract centroid using the Haversine Formula 
(Sinnott, 1984).  Then, I take all the branches within 10 miles of the centroid and calculate 
the local branch access variable as: 
                                                           
2 Census tracts are designed by the Census Bureau to be relatively homogeneous units in terms of 















∑  (1) 
where Branchesco,ct is the branch access variable for census tract ct in county co, nb is the 
number of branches within 10-mile radius of the centroid of census tract ct,  Dct,k is the 
distance of branch k to the centroid of census tract ct.  In accordance with the 
relationship literature, this construction assumes that the farther the branch is from the 
centroid, the less likely it is to improve the accessibility of banking services in the census 
tract.  Five important issues about this variable are worth mentioning.  First, this 
measure is better than counting only the branches inside a census tract because in urban 
areas, one could miss a branch across a street if the tract boundary is the street.  
Including all branches within a certain distance to the tract solves this problem.  Second, 
the implicit assumption is that branches farther than 10 miles have no effect on branch 
access.  Ergungor (2006) finds that including branches more distant than 10 miles 
increases the noise level in the measure; so, I stop at 10 miles.  Third, I assume that bank 
branches can supply relationship services with perfect elasticity.  So, if one branch falls 
within 10 miles of multiple census tracts, the quality of its service to each tract will be a 
function of its distance to the tract and not the number of tracts it has to serve.  In other 
words, the Branches variable for different census tracts may include the same branch, as 
if the branch exclusively served each community alone. Fourth, the natural log captures 
the idea that the marginal contribution of each additional branch will decline in urban 
areas with a large number of bank branches.  Fifth, if the branch is located exactly over 
the census tract centroid, Branchesco,ct will go to infinity.  In my sample, none of the 
branches is closer than 0.02 miles.  But one could conceivably get extremely large 
Branches co,ct values.  I investigate this issue further in robustness checks by winsorizing 
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which treats branches that are closer than 1 mile as if they were at exactly 1 mile.    8
3.2.2 Branch Presence at the County Level 
The next task is to aggregate the census-tract-level measures up to the county 
level.  I accomplish this task by taking a weighed average of individual census tracts in 
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where Branchesco,ct is the tract-level access variable I calculated earlier for county co 
census tract ct, nCO,CT is the number of census tracts in county co, and Ψco,ct is the weight of 
county co, census tract ct. 
I use three weighting schemes in this aggregation.  First, I take a simple average 
of all census tracts in the county ( ,
EW
co ct Ψ = 1/n
CO,CT; equal-weight scheme or Scheme EW).  
The branch access variable created by the weight  ,
EW
co ct Ψ  is BAccessEW.  Second, since I am 
interested primarily in branch presence in low-income census tracts where foreclosures 
are most likely to occur, I use a weighting scheme that emphasizes the branch presence 
















where Ico,ct is the median income of census tract ct in county co and the index c tracks all 
census tracts in the county co.  The branch access variable created by the weight  ,
W
co ct Ψ  is 
BAccessW.  Note that the weight  ,
W
co ct Ψ  is decreasing in census tract median income.  The 
denominator is a county-specific constant that makes the weights add up to one in each 
county.  To see how the weighting scheme works, imagine two counties, X and Y, with   9
two census tracts in each, x1, x2, y1, and y2.  The median incomes for x1 and x2 are $10 and 
$20,  respectively.  The median incomes for y1 and y2 are $100 and $200,  respectively.  
Under weighting scheme W, x1 and y1 get weighted by 2/3 and x2 and y2 get weighted 
by 1/3.  In other words, the largest weight in the county goes to the census tract that has 
the lowest median income.  As a result, counties that have greater access to bank 
branches in their relatively low-income areas will have a higher BAccessW variable.  Put 
differently, I expect any given level of branch accessibility to be more effective in 
lowering foreclosures if it belongs to a low-moderate income census tract than a high-
income tract.  It is worth emphasizing that in calculating each tract’s weight, the tract’s 
income is compared to the other census tracts in its county (in the denominator), not all 
the other census tracts in the state.  This strategy allows me to concentrate on the 
relatively low-income areas of each county where banks should make the greatest 
impact in reducing foreclosures in that county.  Then, after controlling for the cross-
county variation in foreclosures arising from cross-county differences in incomes, I 
expect the foreclosures to be negatively correlated with the presence of banks in low-
income neighborhoods. 
Third, to show that it is indeed the branch presence in low-income areas that 
matters most, I will use a weight that puts the emphasis on branch presence in high-
income census tracts (inverse-weighting scheme or Scheme IW).  With this scheme, I 
expect the negative correlation between BAccess and foreclosure rates to break down.  In 
other words, foreclosure rates should not be lower in counties where banks are located 
in high-income areas at the expense of low-income areas.  The weight on each census 
















The branch access variable created by the weight  ,
IW
co ct Ψ  is BAccessIW.  Note that 
the only difference between (3) and (4) is the inverted numerator (and the denominator 
adjusted accordingly).   10
3.3 HMDA 
Under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, depository and 
nondepository financial institutions report all mortgage applications they receive in each 
census tract by disclosing the loan applicant’s income, race, gender, the loan’s amount 
and purpose (home purchase, refinancing, or purchase of renter-occupied property), 
whether the application was approved or denied and if it is denied, the reason for 
denial, and, starting for the first time with the 2004 data (reported in 2005), the spread of 
the loan price over the Treasury rate of a comparable maturity at the time of origination 
if the spread exceeds 3%.
3  The loan price includes the interest rate as well as points, fees, 
and premiums for private mortgage insurance. 
I exclude refinancings and mortgages to purchase renter-occupied property from 
the analysis.  I also exclude the data on mortgages purchased by financial institutions 
that were originated at an earlier time.  This prevents double counting, once at 
origination and once at the time of sale.  After this clean-up, I am left with 246,327 
mortgage originations (>$17.3 billion) in Ohio in 2000. 
Because a loan’s interest spread is reported only if it is 3 percentage points above 
the Treasury rate, some mortgages are reported with a zero interest rate.  In order to 
estimate the county-level mortgage interest rate, I fit a lognormal distribution over the 
reported spread data in each county, assuming that the distribution is left-censored at 
3%.  I accomplish this by estimating a censored regression model using only an intercept 
on the right-hand side.  The intercept is the mean of the uncensored distribution, which I 
use in the analysis. 
4. Method 
I assess the impact of bank branch presence in 2000, BAccess00, on county 
foreclosure rates by estimating the following regression with OLS.4 
                                                           
3 There are some exemptions to reporting requirements based on an institution’s asset size or the size of its 
mortgage lending business.  However, the reporting threshold is low enough that HMDA represents an 
accurate picture of the local lending market. 
4 I drop the weight subscripts to simplify the notation.  They will be reintroduced when the discussion 
requires them.   11
Forecloset = f (BAccess00, Income00, BAccess00 x Income00, X1)+ εF (5) 
where Forecloset is the county foreclosure rate in each year from 2000 to 2005 (each year 
is estimated separately).  I also estimate the regression using the mean foreclosure rate 
over the 6-year period, M_Foreclose.  Income00 is the natural log of the county median 
household income in 2000.  The interaction term BAccess00 x Income00 captures the 
nonlinear impact of branch presence on foreclosure rates.  Since I expect banking 
relationships to matter most in low-income areas, I expect to observe a negative 
coefficient for BAccess00, but the effect should weaken or disappear in high-income 
counties; so I expect to observe a positive coefficient for the interaction term. 
X1 is a vector of control variables that comprises demographic, and loan-market 
specific factors, which I review below. 
4.1 Demographic Factors 
ChildInFamily00 is the share of children in the county who live in a two-parent 
household.  Because single-parent households may be more cash-constrained, 
ChildInFamily00 may be negatively associated with foreclosure rates. 
Gini00 is a measure of income inequality among the census tracts of the county.  
A value of one would indicate complete inequality of distribution, while a 0 indicates no 
inequality.  Keeping median incomes constant, I expect to see more foreclosures with 
increasing inequality. 
HighSchool00 is the share of the population over 25 years of age whose 
educational achievement is a high school diploma or less. 
PopDens00 is the population density of the county calculated as the population 
divided by the land area. 
UrbanPop00 is the share of the population in the county that is classified as urban 
by the Census Bureau.  Foreclosures may be higher in rural areas because of the 
dependence of the local economies on farming, a volatile sector of the economy. 
Race00 is the share of the African American population in the total county 
population.   12
4.2 Loan-Market Specific Factors 
CreditProblem00 is the share of mortgage applicants denied credit because of poor 
credit histories in 2000.  As I do not have information on the credit quality of borrowers 
in each county, such as credit scores, I use CreditProblem00 as a proxy for credit risk at 
the county level.   
BankShare00 is the share of banks in mortgage originations in the county.  This 
variable controls for the presence of institutions that are not insured by the FDIC (credit 
unions and nonbank mortgage lenders). 
Foreclose99 is the initial value of Foreclose in 1999. 
Herfindahl00 is the deposit market Herfindahl index, where the market is the 
county.   
HomeValue00 is the natural log of the median house price in the county in 2000. 
Origine00 is the dollar amount of mortgages originated in the county per 
household.  A county where lenders originate many loans may see higher foreclosures 
in the future. 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. 
I also examine which of my three weighting schemes has the greatest 
explanatory power.  I hypothesize that Scheme W is better than both EW and IW.  I test 
this hypothesis by estimating the following regressions with OLS: 
M_Foreclose = f (BAccess00W, BAccess00EW, Income00, BAccess00W x Income00, 
BAccess00EW x Income00, X1)+ εF, W-EW  (6) 
M_Foreclose = f (BAccess00W, BAccess00IW, Income00, BAccess00W x Income00, 
BAccess00IW x Income00, X1)+ εF, W-IW  (7) 
Note that (6) includes both BAccess00W and BAccess00EW and (7) includes both 
BAccess00W and BAccess00IW and their interactions with income. 
To examine how the asset size of the bank owning the branch affects foreclosure 
rates, I use a model similar to (5): 
Forecloset = f (SBAccess00, LBAccess00, Income00, SBAccess00 x Income00, 
LBAccess00 x Income00, X1)+ εF (8)   13
where SBAccess00 is the level of access to small-bank branches, and LBAccess00 is the 
level of access to large-bank branches. A small bank is defined as a bank with total assets 
less than $1 billion.  Both access measures are defined in a manner similar to BAccess00 
by defining SBranches and LBranches at census tract level (as in (1)) but by counting large 
and small banks separately. 
There is one variable that I excluded from the analysis so far due to data 
limitations. While the level of interest rates in the market may be a strong determinant of 
foreclosures, the mortgage interest rate data from HMDA is only available in 2004.  So, I 
develop a model that takes the endogeneity of spreads, and foreclosures into account.  
The limitation is that I can only work with one year of foreclosures, 2004. 
In order to take into account the potentially endogenous relationships, I estimate 
the following system using GMM: 
Spread04= f (Z1990, Z2000, Foreclose04, X2)+ εS 
     (9) 
Foreclose04 = f (BAccess00, BAccess00 x Income00, Spread04, Foreclose99, Z2000, X2)+ εF 
where Z2000 includes Income00 and HomeValue00.  Foreclosures are identified by the 
assumption that while banks’ pricing decisions depend on long-term trends in the local 
market, the decision to foreclose will depend on current conditions.  So, the spread 
equation includes the instruments Z1990 but the foreclosure equation does not.  X2 
includes everything in X1, except Foreclose99, and HomeValue00.  HomeValue00 now 
appears in Z2000, and Foreclose99 is included only in the foreclosure equation. 
In my results, I will also report the R-square measure proposed by Windmeijer 
(1995), which is the squared-correlation of the observed and predicted dependent 
variables. 
5. Results 
Table 2 shows the effect of bank branch presence in 2000, BAccess00, on county 
foreclosure rates by estimating the model in (5).  Weighing scheme EW, which puts 
equal weight on all census tracts, is in Panel A, scheme W, which emphasizes branch   14
presence in low-income markets, is in Panel B, and scheme IW, which emphasizes 
branch presence in high-income markets, is in Panel C.  Panel D compares scheme W to 
EW and IW to determine which scheme has greater explanatory power. 
The results show that weighing schemes that ignore the relative income of the 
local market or put the weight on local markets that need relationships and branch 
access the least (EW and IW) capture little or no significant impact from branch presence 
on foreclosure rates (Panels A and C).  However, when BAccess00 focuses primarily on 
the relatively low-income census tracts of the counties (Panel B), my analysis reveals a 
somewhat different picture.  Branch presence in 2000, BAccess00W, is negatively 
correlated with foreclosures in all years except 2000, and the correlation disappears in 
higher-income counties (the positive and significant interaction term).  However, these 
findings are economically weak and their statistical significance does not appear robust.  
In a low-income county, such as Meigs County, where the median household income is 
$27,287, a one-standard-deviation increase in BAccess00W is associated with an average 
annual decline of about 5% in county foreclosure rates (i.e, 5% of the annual mean 
foreclosure rate of 2% using the coefficients for M_Foreclose).  Also, note that the branch 
variables lose their statistical significance in all years, except in 2004, 2005 and the six-
year average, in the expanded specification that includes a wider set of demographic 
factors.  Still, Panel D shows that weighting scheme W does a better job explaining 
foreclosures than the other two. 
The results also show that, as expected, foreclosure rates are negatively 
correlated with incomes (Income00).  Foreclosure rates are also negatively correlated with 
deposit market concentration (Herfinahl00).  This finding is in line with the Petersen and 
Rajan’s (1995) argument that banks must have market power to recoup their initial 
investment into the relationship from future profitable transactions with the borrower.  
Foreclosures are also lower if a larger share of mortgages are originated by banks 
(BankShare00).  The extent of bank lending may be an indicator of the absence of the 
fringe financial sector that is often blamed for predatory lending practices.  Home values 
are negatively correlated with foreclosure rates (HomeValue00).  If the collateral is 
valuable and the mortgage is in arrears, a foreclosure may be avoided by selling the   15
asset and paying back the lender.  ChildInFam00, the share of children who live in a two-
parent household, is negatively correlated with foreclosures.  This is in line with my 
earlier claim that single-parent households may be more cash-constrained.  Finally, 
Race00 is uncorrelated with foreclosure rates. 
The weak significance of BAccess00W in Panel B is mainly a result of treating 
large-bank and small-bank branches identically.  Using Scheme W, Table 3 shows that 
the size of the institution present in the market is important.  In fact, my earlier 
significant results are driven entirely by the branches of small banks.  The only exception 
is 2000, which is an unusual year in the sense that the average foreclosure rate in 2000 is 
half of the later years in the sample.   In other words, if economic conditions are such 
that overall foreclosure rates are low, branch access does not matter.  In later years, a 
one–standard-deviation increase in the SBAccess00 in a low-income county is associated 
with a decline in foreclosure rates that varies between 5% (2001) and 12% (2004).  
Overall, the evidence supports Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Next, I consider the impact of the price of mortgages originated in the market on 
foreclosures.  When I take the level of spreads into account (9), Table 4 shows that the 
results are very strong when the emphasis is on low-income markets (BAccess00W).  
Using the median household income of Meigs County as an example, a one-standard-
deviation increase in BAccess00W is associated with a one-percentage-point drop in 
foreclosures in 2004; that is, the foreclosure rate drops by 43 percent relative to the mean 
foreclosure rate of 2.3 percent.  These findings support Hypothesis 1.  Table 4 also shows 
a positive correlation between mortgage spreads and foreclosures, as expected. 
Also note that when I segregate the access variable into small and large-bank 
access, I find once again that, in support of Hypothesis 2, the results are driven by small 
banks.  Even though the large-bank access appears economically significant, its effect is 
statistically zero.   16
5.1 Robustness Checks 
I subject my results to two robustness checks.  For the sake of brevity, I will 
present the results for the six-year average foreclosure rate, M_Foreclose, and weighing 
scheme W alone.   
First, given the small sample size, I make sure that my results are not driven by a 
few outliers.  I accomplish this by winsorizing BAccess00W, SBAccess00W, and 
LBAccess00W at 1% and 99% levels.  In other words, any observation that is below the 1st 
percentile or above the 99th percentile of the sample is reset to the 1st percentile and 99th 
percentile values.  The winsorized variables are named BAccess00W, W, SBAccess00W, W, 
and LBAccess00W, W.  The results in Table 5 show that my conclusions are not affected by 
outlier observations. 







 (1’).  The new variable is named BAccess00W,1M.  
SBAccess00W,1M and LBAccess00W,1M are defined similarly.  Those results are in Table 6.  
Panel A shows the OLS estimates, and Panel B shows the GMM estimates with 
endogenous mortgage spreads.  My conclusions are not affected by outliers. 
Second, by design, Branchesco,ct in (1) assumes that the impact of a branch on 
foreclosure rates declines with its distance to the market.  If this assumption is correct, 
disregarding the distance and simply counting the bank branches in and around a 
neighborhood should weaken the results by adding noise to the measure.  To test this 
hypothesis, I redefine Branchesco,ct as 
,
ND
co ct Branches = ln (1+nb) and recalculate the branch 
access variable BAccess00W,ND.  Table 7 shows the results.  If I ignore the distance and 
treat all branches in and around the neighborhood the same, the economic and statistical 
significance of the new access variable BAccess00W,ND declines.  To make sure that 
BAccess00W is the superior measure compared to BAccess00W,ND, I include them both into 
the regression including their interactions with income (Panel C).  The results confirm 
that BAccess00W is the superior variable as the significance of BAccess00W,ND disappears 
when both variables are included into the regressions.  Thus, considering the distance   17
between a neighborhood and lenders is important in estimating the impact of lender 
presence on foreclosures. 
6. Conclusion 
Banks specialize in screening and monitoring informationally opaque borrowers.  
Ergungor (2006) shows that mortgage originations rise with increased bank branch 
presence in a low-income market because the proximity to the borrower reduces the 
distance-related frictions in the information gathering process.  In this paper, I examine 
the success of such lending.  If there is more lending in the low-income area that have 
more bank branches, it would not be surprising to see more loan defaults and 
foreclosures.  Yet I find that foreclosures are not higher in these areas; on the contrary, I 
observe a significant decline in foreclosure rates when there are more branches present 
in the low-income communities of a county. 
I also find that the size of the institution operating the branch in the market is 
important.  Small banks are the institutions that drive the results of the paper.  While the 
small sample size necessitates caution in interpreting these results, this paper provides 
support for the hypothesis that bank-borrower relationships are indispensable in low-
income communities. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 Mean  Std  Dev Median  Minimum  Maximum 
Endogenous Variables         
 Spread04  1.316  0.328  1.288  0.511  2.389 
 Foreclose00  0.013  0.004  0.012  0.003  0.024 
 Foreclose01  0.017  0.005  0.016  0.005  0.031 
 Foreclose02  0.021  0.007  0.020  0.010  0.037 
 Foreclose03  0.023  0.007  0.022  0.011  0.040 
 Foreclose04  0.023  0.007  0.023  0.011  0.040 
 Foreclose05  0.024  0.007  0.024  0.008  0.045 
            
Exogenous Variables         
 BAccess00W 0.172  0.109  0.137  0.050  0.674 
 BAccess00EW 0.144  0.082  0.121  0.049  0.544 
 BAccess00IW 0.318  0.236  0.275  0.128  2.019 
 BAccess00W, ND 0.325  0.169  0.293  0.137 1.385 
 BAccess00W, 1M 0.106  0.045  0.093  0.050  0.338 
 SBAccess00W 0.093  0.091  0.070  0.003  0.580 
 LBAccess00W 0.078  0.065  0.065  0.000  0.369 
 SBAccess00W, ND 0.159  0.097  0.140  0.017  0.480 
 LBAccess00W, ND 0.166  0.148  0.121 0.000  0.906 
 SBAccess00W, 1M 0.054  0.033  0.049  0.003  0.156 
 LBAccess00W, 1M 0.052  0.037  0.049  0.000  0.213 
 BankShare00  0.709  0.078  0.708  0.395  0.844 
 ChildInFam00  0.709  0.060  0.708  0.574  0.893 
 CreditProblem00  0.372  0.058  0.370  0.214  0.515 
 Foreclose99  0.012  0.004  0.011  0.005  0.023 
 Gini00  0.105  0.057  0.091  0.012  0.255 
 Herfindahl00  0.156  0.081  0.127  0.073  0.454 
 HighSchool00  0.188  0.053  0.179  0.071  0.485 
 HighSchool90  0.268  0.061  0.258  0.156  0.531 
 HomeValue00  11.432 0.240 11.404 10.986  12.149 
 HomeValue90  11.083 0.246 11.065 10.597  11.773 
 Income00  10.592 0.191 10.608 10.179  11.193 
 Income90  10.404 0.201 10.437  9.918  10.872 
 Origine00  0.790  0.692  0.810  -0.897  2.777 
 Race00  0.043  0.055  0.023  0.002  0.282 
 Urban00  0.511  0.241  0.517  0.022  0.992 
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Table 2: The Effect of Branch Presence on Foreclosure Rates – OLS Estimates 
  
This table shows the effect of bank branch presence in 2000 on county foreclosure rates by estimating the following regressions with OLS: 
 
Foreclose = f (BAccess00EW, Income00, BAccess00EW x Income00, X1)+ εF, EW   (Panel  A) 
Foreclose = f (BAccess00W, Income00, BAccess00W x Income00, X1)+ εF, W   (Panel  B) 
Foreclose = f (BAccess00IW, Income00, BAccess00IW x Income00, X1)+ εF, IW   (Panel  C) 
 
where BAccess00EW is the equally-weighted access variable, BAccess00W is the access variable calculated using the weighting scheme in (3), 
BAccess00IW is the access variable calculated using the weighting scheme in (4).  X1 is a vector of control variables, which I add to the regression in 
small steps due to their high correlation with Income00.  Foreclose is the county foreclosure rate in each year from 2000 to 2005.  M_Foreclose is the 
mean foreclosure rate over the 6-year period. 
 
Panel D shows that BAccess00W has greater explanatory power than BAccess00EW or BAccess00IW by estimating the following regressions with OLS: 
 
M_Foreclose = f (BAccess00W, BAccess00EW, Income00, BAccess00W x Income00, BAccess00EW x Income00, X1)+ εF, W-EW 
M_Foreclose = f (BAccess00W, BAccess00IW, Income00, BAccess00W x Income00, BAccess00IW x Income00, X1)+ εF, W-IW 
 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
(***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A – BAccess00EW 
 
  Foreclose00    Foreclose01  Foreclose02  Foreclose03  Foreclose04  Foreclose05  M_Foreclose 
BAccess00EW -0.0072  -0.0791    -0.3764  -0.1816  -0.3846  -0.1960  -0.3883 -0.2710  -0.6781 -0.5448  -0.5270 -0.3635 -0.3936 -0.2727 
 (-0.04)  (-0.45)    (-1.69) * (-0.82) (-1.25)  (-0.61) (-1.26)  (-0.88)  (-2.10) ** (-1.72) *  (-1.60) (-1.09)  (-1.79) * (-1.25) 
BAccess00EW x Income00  0.0010  0.0079    0.0357  0.0171  0.0369  0.0190 0.0369  0.0260 0.0644  0.0515  0.0499 0.0343  0.0375 0.0259 
 (0.06)  (0.47)    (1.70) *  (0.82) (1.27)  (0.63) (1.27)  (0.89) (2.11)  (1.71) (1.60)  (1.09)  (1.80) *  (1.26) 
CreditProblem00 -0.0027  -0.0014    0.0053  0.0035  -0.0066  -0.0069 0.0065  0.0092  0.0062  0.0042  -0.0106 -0.0094 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (-0.62)  (-0.31)    (0.88)  (0.61)  (-0.79)  (-0.83)  (0.77) (1.17)  (0.71) (0.51)  (-1.19)  (-1.09)  (-0.05)  (-0.02) 
Foreclose99 0.6954  0.6916    0.8149  0.6080  0.9640  0.7297 1.0350  0.7882 0.8661  0.6217  0.8202 0.6202  0.8659 0.6766 
  (9.25) *** (8.03) ***    (7.92) *** (5.69) *** (6.79) *** (4.70) *** (7.28) *** (5.30) *** (5.79) *** (4.05) *** (5.40) *** (3.85) *** (8.50) *** (6.40) *** 
BankShare00 -0.0071  -0.0050    -0.0120  -0.0105  -0.0111  -0.0076  -0.0127 -0.0072  -0.0159 -0.0088  -0.0136 -0.0056 -0.0121 -0.0075 
  (-2.28) **  (-1.45)   (-2.81) *** (-2.48) ** (-1.88) *  (-1.24)  (-2.15) ** (-1.21)  (-2.56) ** (-1.44)  (-2.15) **  (-0.88)  (-2.85) *** (-1.78) * 
Herfindahl00 -0.0041  -0.0029    -0.0134  -0.0108  -0.0169  -0.0156  -0.0152 -0.0135  -0.0140 -0.0140  -0.0187 -0.0181 -0.0137 -0.0125 
 (-1.10)  (-0.73)    (-2.63) ** (-2.20) ** (-2.41) ** (-2.20) ** (-2.16) ** (-1.99) ** (-1.89) * (-2.00) ** (-2.48) ** (-2.47) ** (-2.72) *** (-2.59) ** 
Income00 -0.0047  -0.0024    -0.0111  0.0104  -0.0157  0.0083  -0.0121 0.0133  -0.0176 0.0112  -0.0203 0.0047  -0.0136 0.0076 
 (-1.34)  (-0.46)    (-2.30) ** (1.56)  (-2.36) ** (0.86) (-1.81)  (1.43)  (-2.52) ** (1.17)  (-2.84) *** (0.47)  (-2.85) *** (1.15) 
Origine00 0.0006  -0.0004    0.0010  0.0018  0.0019  0.0022 0.0022  0.0012 0.0028  0.0026  0.0034 0.0023  0.0020 0.0016 
 (0.70)  (-0.41)    (0.89)  (1.53) (1.30)  (1.27) (1.48)  (0.76)  (1.77) *  (1.52)  (2.10) **  (1.32)  (1.84) *  (1.40) 
Race00 0.0192  0.0087    0.0160  0.0001  0.0134  -0.0067  0.0071 -0.0232  0.0215 -0.0041  0.0256 0.0002  0.0171 -0.0041 
  (2.23) **  (0.85)  (1.36)  (0.01)  (0.82)  (-0.36)  (0.44)  (-1.31) (1.26)  (-0.22) (1.47)  (0.01) (1.47)  (-0.33) 
PopDens00 0.0001  0.0003    -0.0001  0.0000 0.0008  0.0018  -0.0001  0.0023 -0.0004 -0.0002  0.0007  0.0011  0.0002  0.0009 
 (0.20)  (0.38)    (-0.13)  (0.02)  (0.69)  (1.11)  (-0.11) (1.44)  (-0.31)  (-0.11)  (0.56) (0.65)  (0.20)  (0.81) 
ChildInFam00   -0.0137      -0.0212    -0.0332   -0.0535   -0.0324    -0.0452   -0.0332 
   (-1.60)      (-1.99) **    (-2.14) **   (-3.61) ***    (-2.11) **   (-2.82) ***   (-3.16) *** 
Urban00   -0.0033      -0.0001    -0.0044   -0.0111   -0.0048   -0.0047  -0.0047 
   (-1.16)      (-0.02)    (-0.86)    (-2.24) **   (-0.94)   (-0.88)   (-1.35) 
Gini00   0.0116      0.0139    0.0102   0.0080   0.0410   0.0173   0.0170 
   (1.11)      (1.07)    (0.54)    (0.44)    (2.20) **   (0.88)   (1.32) 
HomeValue00   0.0018      -0.0150    -0.0131   -0.0092   -0.0144    -0.0061   -0.0093 
   (0.53)      (-3.70) ***   (-2.21) **  (-1.62)    (-2.46) **  (-1.00)    (-2.33) ** 
HighSchool00   0.0005      0.0189    0.0258   0.0212   0.0523    0.0427   0.0269 
   (0.07)      (0.21)    (0.20)    (0.17)    (0.40)    (0.31)    (0.30) 
Adj. R-Square  0.78  0.78    0.73  0.78  0.66  0.69 0.65  0.69 0.62  0.68 0.65  0.70  0.76  0.80   25
Panel B – BAccess00W 
 
  Foreclose00    Foreclose01  Foreclose02  Foreclose03    Foreclose04  Foreclose05  M_Foreclose 
BAccess00W -0.0677  -0.1214    -0.4652  -0.2710  -0.5028  -0.2911  -0.5548  -0.3935  -0.8039  -0.6274  -0.6676 -0.4885 -0.5103  -0.3655 
 (-0.49)  (-0.80)    (-2.50) ** (-1.44)  (-1.94) *  (-1.06)  (-2.15) ** (-1.51)    (-2.97) *** (-2.35) ** (-2.41) ** (-1.73) * (-2.78) *** (-1.99) ** 
BAccess00W x Income00  0.0067  0.0119    0.0443  0.0256  0.0481  0.0279  0.0528  0.0377  0.0763  0.0592 0.0633  0.0463  0.0486  0.0347 
 (0.51)  (0.83)    (2.51) **  (1.44)  (1.96) *  (1.07)  (2.16) **  (1.53)    (2.98) *** (2.34) ** (2.42) ** (1.73) * (2.80) *** (1.99) ** 
CreditProblem00 -0.0026  -0.0010    0.0055  0.0035  -0.0068  -0.0070  0.0067  0.0098  0.0057  0.0033  -0.0107 -0.0092 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (-0.58)  (-0.23)    (0.94)  (0.62)  (-0.82)  (-0.85)  (0.82)  (1.25)  (0.67)  (0.41)  (-1.22) (-1.08)  (-0.06)  (-0.02) 
Foreclose99 0.6993  0.7071    0.8129  0.6136  0.9558  0.7403  1.0309  0.8132  0.8459  0.6153 0.8072  0.6325  0.8587  0.6870 
  (9.28) *** (8.16) ***    (8.04) *** (5.71) *** (6.79) *** (4.72) *** (7.36) *** (5.46) ***    (5.76) *** (4.02) *** (5.38) *** (3.92) *** (8.63) *** (6.52) *** 
BankShare00 -0.0068  -0.0046    -0.0110  -0.0101  -0.0098  -0.0068  -0.0114  -0.0063  -0.0141  -0.0077  -0.0121 -0.0048 -0.0109 -0.0067 
  (-2.17) **  (-1.34)   (-2.62) ** (-2.38) ** (-1.67) *  (-1.11)  (-1.95) *  (-1.08)    (-2.32) ** (-1.28)  (-1.95) *  (-0.76)  (-2.63) ** (-1.62) 
Herfindahl00 -0.0039  -0.0027    -0.0134  -0.0113  -0.0176  -0.0165  -0.0155  -0.0137  -0.0154  -0.0160  -0.0196 -0.0188 -0.0142 -0.0132 
 (-1.02)  (-0.68)    (-2.62) ** (-2.29) ** (-2.47) ** (-2.28) ** (-2.19) ** (-2.00) **    (-2.08) ** (-2.26) ** (-2.58) ** (-2.54) ** (-2.83) *** (-2.71) *** 
Income00 -0.0053  -0.0039    -0.0131  0.0074  -0.0181  0.0050  -0.0153 0.0089    -0.0214 0.0063  -0.0239 -0.0002 -0.0162  0.0039 
 (-1.45)  (-0.71)    (-2.69) *** (1.07)  (-2.66) *** (0.50)  (-2.27) ** (0.93)    (-3.03) *** (0.64)  (-3.30) *** (-0.02)  (-3.37) *** (0.58) 
Origine00 0.0005  -0.0005    0.0009  0.0017  0.0019  0.0021  0.0021  0.0010  0.0029  0.0027 0.0033  0.0022  0.0019  0.0015 
 (0.60)  (-0.57)    (0.84)  (1.47) (1.30)  (1.23) (1.44)  (0.61)    (1.86) *  (1.63)  (2.14) **  (1.25)  (1.86) *  (1.33) 
Race00 0.0186  0.0093    0.0148  0.0004  0.0139 -0.0043  0.0060 -0.0225   0.0228 -0.0006 0.0255  0.0007  0.0169  -0.0028 
  (2.18) **  (0.93)  (1.29)  (0.03)  (0.87)  (-0.24)  (0.37)  (-1.31)   (1.37) (-0.03)  (1.50) (0.04)  (1.50) (-0.23) 
PopDens00 0.0001  0.0003    0.0000  0.0001 0.0007  0.0016 0.0000  0.0023    -0.0004 -0.0004  0.0007  0.0012  0.0002  0.0008 
 (0.20)  (0.34)    (-0.01)  (0.10)  (0.65)  (1.03)  (-0.01)  (1.56)  (-0.38)  (-0.28)  (0.67)  (0.78)  (0.25)  (0.82) 
ChildInFam00   -0.0133      -0.0202    -0.0316   -0.0522      -0.0295    -0.0435   -0.0317 
   (-1.56)      (-1.91) *    (-2.04) **   (-3.56) ***      (-1.95) *    (-2.73) ***   (-3.05) *** 
Urban00   -0.0033      -0.0004    -0.0041   -0.0113     -0.0044   -0.0052  -0.0048 
   (-1.18)      (-0.12)    (-0.82)    (-2.40) **     (-0.90)   (-1.01)   (-1.43) 
Gini00   0.0095      0.0146    0.0094   0.0058     0.0426   0.0174   0.0166 
   (0.91)      (1.12)    (0.49)    (0.32)      (2.29) **   (0.89)   (1.29) 
HomeValue00   0.0029      -0.0143    -0.0117   -0.0070     -0.0135   -0.0047  -0.0080 
   (0.87)      (-3.41) ***   (-1.92) *  (-1.21)      (-2.26) **  (-0.74)   (-1.96) * 
HighSchool00   -0.0008      0.0171    0.0245   0.0178      0.0509    0.0395   0.0249 
   (-0.11)      (0.19)    (0.19)    (0.14)      (0.37)    (0.29)      (0.28) 
Adj. R-Square  0.79  0.78    0.74  0.79  0.67  0.70  0.67  0.70  0.64  0.69 0.66  0.70  0.78  0.81   26
Panel C – BAccess00IW 
 
  Foreclose00    Foreclose01  Foreclose02  Foreclose03    Foreclose04  Foreclose05  M_Foreclose 
BAccess00IW -0.0062  -0.0043    0.0113  0.0511  0.0208  0.0439  -0.0167  -0.0396  -0.0868  -0.0318  -0.1314 -0.1398 -0.0348  -0.0201 
 (-0.09)  (-0.06)    (0.13)  (0.61)  (0.17)  (0.35)  (-0.13)  (-0.33)  (-0.65)  (-0.26)  (-0.98)  (-1.10)  (-0.39)  (-0.24) 
BAccess00IW x Income00  0.0006  0.0004    -0.0013  -0.0049  -0.0021  -0.0042  0.0012  0.0035  0.0078  0.0028 0.0120  0.0128  0.0030  0.0017 
 (0.09)  (0.07)    (-0.15)  (-0.63)  (-0.18)  (-0.37)  (0.11)  (0.32)  (0.63)  (0.24)  (0.97)  (1.08)  (0.36)  (0.22) 
CreditProblem00 -0.0034  -0.0025    0.0051  0.0037  -0.0078  -0.0082  0.0063  0.0083  0.0053  0.0041  -0.0109 -0.0089 -0.0009 -0.0006 
 (-0.76)  (-0.55)    (0.85)  (0.67)  (-0.93)  (-1.01)  (0.76)  (1.07)  (0.60)  (0.51)  (-1.22) (-1.06)  (-0.14)  (-0.11) 
Foreclose99 0.6817  0.6759    0.7934  0.5920  0.9254  0.6938  1.0032  0.7573  0.8474  0.5996 0.8136  0.6148  0.8441  0.6555 
  (9.03) *** (7.84) ***    (7.71) *** (5.66) *** (6.47) *** (4.50) *** (7.13) *** (5.14) ***    (5.58) *** (3.88) *** (5.36) *** (3.87) *** (8.24) *** (6.25) *** 
BankShare00 -0.0070  -0.0047    -0.0130  -0.0119  -0.0120  -0.0084  -0.0136  -0.0077  -0.0166  -0.0101  -0.0138 -0.0058 -0.0127 -0.0081 
  (-2.20) **  (-1.34)   (-3.01) *** (-2.82) *** (-1.99) *  (-1.35)  (-2.30) ** (-1.29)    (-2.60) ** (-1.62)  (-2.16) **  (-0.90)  (-2.94) *** (-1.91) 
Herfindahl00 -0.0054  -0.0038    -0.0127  -0.0096  -0.0178  -0.0163  -0.0154  -0.0150  -0.0141  -0.0128  -0.0190 -0.0190 -0.0141 -0.0127 
 (-1.49)  (-0.97)    (-2.57) ** (-2.01) ** (-2.59) ** (-2.32) ** (-2.27) ** (-2.23) **    (-1.93) * (-1.81) * (-2.61) ** (-2.63) ** (-2.86) *** (-2.66) *** 
Income00 -0.0051  -0.0012    -0.0053  0.0143  -0.0100  0.0124  -0.0066 0.0159    -0.0103 0.0187  -0.0158 0.0059  -0.0089 0.0110 
 (-1.59)  (-0.24)    (-1.21)  (2.35) ** (-1.66) *  (1.39) (-1.12)  (1.86) *    (-1.60)  (2.09) ** (-2.47) **  (0.65)  (-2.05) ** (1.81) * 
Origine00 0.0007  -0.0002    0.0016  0.0025  0.0027  0.0031  0.0029  0.0021  0.0034  0.0034 0.0037  0.0026  0.0025  0.0023 
 (0.86)  (-0.19)    (1.40)  (2.13) ** (1.75) * (1.78) * (1.94) *  (1.26)    (2.07) ** (1.95) * (2.24) **  (1.47)  (2.26) ** (1.91) * 
Race00 0.0224  0.0116    0.0206  0.0038  0.0216  0.0011  0.0147 -0.0123    0.0304 0.0026  0.0331 0.0087  0.0238 0.0026 
  (2.62) **  (1.10)  (1.77) *  (0.30) (1.33)  (0.06) (0.92)  (-0.68)    (1.77) *  (0.14)  (1.92) *  (0.45)  (2.05) ** (0.20) 
PopDens00 -0.0001  -0.0001    -0.0006  -0.0004 0.0000  0.0008 -0.0009  0.0012    -0.0012 -0.0008  0.0000  0.0007  -0.0005  0.0002 
 (-0.25)  (-0.15)    (-0.80)  (-0.37)  (-0.04)  (0.51)  (-0.82)  (0.82)  (-1.08)  (-0.51)  (0.00)  (0.45)  (-0.63)  (0.23) 
ChildInFam00   -0.0134      -0.0182    -0.0294   -0.0504      -0.0316    -0.0455   -0.0314 
   (-1.52)      (-1.71) *    (-1.87) *   (-3.35) ***      (-2.00) **   (-2.80) ***   (-2.93) *** 
Urban00   -0.0022      0.0017    -0.0014    -0.0080     -0.0020    -0.0030   -0.0025 
   (-0.80)      (0.50)    (-0.29)    (-1.67) *     (-0.39)   (-0.58)   (-0.73) 
Gini00   0.0122      0.0097    0.0083   0.0012     0.0296   0.0048   0.0110 
   (1.15)      (0.75)    (0.44)    (0.06)      (1.56)    (0.25)    (0.85) 
HomeValue00   0.0011      -0.0155    -0.0142   -0.0098     -0.0153   -0.0059  -0.0099 
   (0.35)      (-3.88) ***   (-2.41) **   (-1.74) *      (-2.60) **  (-0.97)    (-2.48) ** 
HighSchool00   0.0033      0.0205    0.0308   0.0251      0.0553    0.0428   0.0296 
   (0.46)      (0.24)    (0.24)    (0.21)      (0.43)    (0.33)    (0.34) 
Adj. R-Square  0.76  0.80    0.72  0.79  0.66  0.70  0.65  0.70  0.60  0.68 0.65  0.70  0.76  0.81 
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Panel D – BAccess00W vs. BAccess00EW and BAccess00W vs. BAccess00IW 
 
  M_Foreclose 
  W vs. EW  W vs. IW 
BAccess00W -0.7681  -0.4124 
 (-1.80) * (-2.21) ** 
BAccess00W x Income00  0.0725  0.0394 
 (1.80) * (2.22) ** 
BAccess00EW 0.5139   
 (1.04)   
BAccess00EW x Income00  -0.0482   
 (-1.04)   
BAccess00IW   -0.0146 
   (-0.17) 
BAccess00IW x Income00    0.0011 
   (0.14) 
CreditProblem00 -0.0007  0.0008 
 (-0.13)  (0.15) 
Foreclose99 0.6743  0.6904 
 (6.30) *** (6.56) *** 
BankShare00 -0.0065  -0.0072 
 (-1.56)  (-1.72) * 
Herfindahl00 -0.0136  -0.0137 
 (-2.78) *** (-2.80) *** 
Income00 0.0036  0.0017 
 (0.52)  (0.23) 
Origine00 0.0018  0.0018 
 (1.51)  (1.56) 
Race00 -0.0014  0.0028 
 (-0.11)  (0.22) 
PopDens00 0.0008  0.0005 
 (0.72)  (0.52) 
ChildInFam00 -0.0306  -0.0285 
 (-2.91) *** (-2.69) *** 
Urban00 -0.0043  -0.0038 
 (-1.24)  (-1.13) 
Gini00 0.0164  0.0114 
 (1.25)  (0.84) 
HomeValue00 -0.0082  -0.0069 
 (-1.97) * (-1.66) 
HighSchool00 0.0247  0.0234 
 (2.73) *** (2.58) ** 
Adj. R-Square  0.81  0.81 
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Table 3: The Effect of Small vs. Large Bank Branch Presence on Foreclosure Rates – OLS 
Estimates 
 
This table shows the effect of small-bank branch presence, SBAccess00W and large-bank branch 
presence in 2000, LBAccess00W, on county foreclosure rates by estimating the following regression 
with OLS: 
 
Foreclose = f (SBAccess00W, LBAccess00W, Income00, SBAccess00W x Income00, 
LBAccess00W x Income00, X1)+ εF 
 
where X1 is a vector of control variables.  Foreclose is the county foreclosure rate in each year from 
2000 to 2005.  M_Foreclose is the mean foreclosure rate over the 6-year period. 
 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
(***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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  2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 2005  M 
SBAccess00W  -0.0943 -0.5605 -0.8641 -0.8022 -1.0264 -0.5824 -0.6550 
 (-0.48)  (-2.30) ** (-2.48) ** (-2.38) ** (-2.95) *** (-1.67) * (-2.74) ***
SBAccess00W  x  Income00  0.0094 0.0535 0.0829 0.0768 0.0975 0.0551 0.0625 
 (0.51)  (2.31) ** (2.50) ** (2.40) ** (2.94) *** (1.66) * (2.75) *** 
LBAccess00W  -0.5514 -0.0787 0.2775 0.1441 -0.2262 0.0620 -0.0621 
 (-2.06) ** (-0.24)  (0.58)  (0.31)  (-0.47)  (0.12)  (-0.19) 
LBAccess00W  x  Income00  0.0519 0.0069 -0.0266  -0.0134 0.0208 -0.0051 0.0057 
 (2.06) ** (0.22) (-0.59)  (-0.31) (0.46) (-0.11) (0.19) 
CreditProblem00  -0.0016 0.0054 -0.0031 0.0127 0.0061 -0.0081 0.0019 
  (-0.35) (0.95) (-0.37) (1.61) (0.74) (-0.94) (0.34) 
Foreclose99  0.7091 0.6394 0.7894 0.8468 0.6495 0.6357 0.7117 
 (8.26) *** (5.96) *** (5.14) *** (5.71) *** (4.24) *** (3.90) *** (6.77) *** 
BankShare00  -0.0038 -0.0113 -0.0097 -0.0086 -0.0097 -0.0060 -0.0082 
 (-1.11)  (-2.66) *** (-1.59) (-1.45) (-1.60) (-0.93) (-1.96) * 
Herfindahl00  -0.0048 -0.0106 -0.0141 -0.0114 -0.0143 -0.0162 -0.0119 
 (-1.18)  (-2.09) ** (-1.95) * (-1.62) (-1.98) * (-2.11) ** (-2.40) ** 
Income00  -0.0054 0.0051 0.0013 0.0068 0.0038 0.0011 0.0021 
  (-0.97) (0.73) (0.13) (0.70) (0.38) (0.10) (0.31) 
Origine00  -0.0005 0.0017 0.0020 0.0009 0.0026 0.0021 0.0015 
  (-0.55) (1.45) (1.21) (0.58) (1.61) (1.22) (1.31) 
Race00 0.0094  -0.0014  -0.0078  -0.0249  -0.0030  0.0003  -0.0046 
  (0.95) (-0.12) (-0.44)  (-1.46)  (-0.17) (0.01) (-0.38) 
PopDens00  0.0005 0.0000 0.0013 0.0020  -0.0006 0.0010 0.0007 
  (0.57) (-0.01) (0.85) (1.38) (-0.43) (0.61) (0.66) 
ChildInFam00  -0.0141 -0.0187 -0.0283 -0.0496 -0.0272 -0.0423 -0.0300 
 (-1.67) * (-1.78) * (-1.88) * (-3.41) *** (-1.81) * (-2.64) ** (-2.91) ***
Urban00  -0.0026 -0.0001 -0.0037 -0.0113 -0.0041 -0.0059 -0.0046 
  (-0.95) (-0.02) (-0.77) (-2.41) (-0.85) (-1.14) (-1.38) 
Gini00  0.0071 0.0206 0.0220 0.0154 0.0514 0.0216 0.0230 
 (0.66)  (1.53)  (1.14)  (0.83)  (2.68) *** (1.06)  (1.75) * 
HomeValue00  0.0015 -0.0127 -0.0080 -0.0040 -0.0109 -0.0027 -0.0061 
 (0.45)  (-2.93) *** (-1.29) (-0.66) (-1.76) * (-0.41)  (-1.44) 
HighSchool00  -0.0015 0.0148 0.0202 0.0151 0.0480 0.0397 0.0227 
  (-0.20) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.37) (0.29) (0.25) 
Adj. R-Square  0.79  0.79  0.71  0.71  0.69 0.70 0.81 
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Table 4: The Effect of Branch Presence on Foreclosure Rates – GMM Estimates 
 
This table shows the effect of bank branch presence in 2000, BAccess00W, under weighting scheme 
B, on county foreclosure rates by estimating the following system with GMM: 
Spread04= f (Z1990, Z2000, Foreclose04, X2)+ εS 
Foreclose04 = f (BAccess00W, BAccess00W x Income00, Spread04, Foreclose99, Z2000, X2)+ εF 
where X2 is a vector of control variables.  Z1990 are the instruments that identify Foreclose04.  The 
analysis is also repeated separately for large and small banks. 
 
R-square is the squared-correlation of the observed endogenous variable with its predicted value. 
 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
(***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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  Foreclose04 
BAccess00W -3.6853   
 (-2.38) **  
BAccess00W x Income00  0.3488   
 (2.38) **  
SBAccess00W   -4.8065 
   (-1.84) * 
SBAccess00W x Income00    0.4552 
   (1.84) * 
LBAccess00W   -9.5963 
   (-1.10) 
LBAccess00W x Income00   0.9010 
   (1.10) 
ChildInFam00 0.0023  0.0169 
 (0.11)  (0.35) 
Urban00 -0.0108  0.0047 
 (-1.56)  (0.16) 
Race00 0.0248  0.0620 
 (0.90)  (0.60) 
HomeValue00 0.0126  0.0119 
 (1.95) * (0.46) 
Income00 -0.0700  -0.1231 
 (-2.25) ** (-1.40) 
CreditProblem00 0.0113  0.0058 
 (1.02)  (0.26) 
Foreclose99 0.7275  0.5606 
 (3.34) *** (1.13) 
PopDens00 -0.0008  -0.0059 
 (-0.41)  (-0.43) 
Gini00 0.0528  0.0652 
 (1.41)  (0.84) 
BankShare00 0.0097  0.0271 
 (0.77)  (0.69) 
Herfindahl00 -0.0278  -0.0524 
 (-2.25) ** (-1.37) 
Origine00 0.0018  0.0061 
 (0.69)  (0.78) 
Spread04 0.0112  0.0214 
 (1.87) * (0.95) 
R-Square  0.60 0.43 
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Table 5: The Effect of Branch Presence on the Foreclosure Rates: Winsorized Sample – OLS 
Estimates 
 
This table shows the effect of bank branch presence in 2000, winsorized at 1 and 99%, 
BAccess00W, W, on county foreclosure rates by estimating the following regression with OLS: 
 
M_Foreclose = f (BAccess00W, W, Income00, BAccess00W, W x Income00, X1)+ εF 
 
where X1 is a vector of control variables.  M_Foreclose is the mean foreclosure rate over the 6-year 
period. 
 
The table also reports the results with banks segregated by size and access variables winsorized 
at 1 and 99%. 
 
M_ Foreclose = f (SBAccess00W, W, LBAccess00W, W, Income00, SBAccess00W, W x Income00, 
LBAccess00W, W x Income00, X1)+ εF 
  
t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
(***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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  M_Foreclose 
BAccess00W, W -0.3655   
 (-1.99) **  
BAccess00W, W x Income00  0.0347   
 (1.99) **  
SBAccess00W, W   -0.6550 
   (-2.74) *** 
SBAccess00W, W x Income00    0.0625 
   (2.75) *** 
LBAccess00W, W   -0.0621 
   (-0.19) 
LBAccess00W, W x Income00    0.0057 
   (0.19) 
CreditProblem00 -0.0001  0.0019 
 (-0.02)  (0.34) 
Foreclose99 0.6870  0.7117 
 (6.52) *** (6.77) *** 
BankShare00 -0.0067  -0.0082 
 (-1.62)  (-1.96) * 
Herfindahl00 -0.0132  -0.0119 
 (-2.71) *** (-2.40) ** 
Income00 0.0039  0.0021 
 (0.58)  (0.31) 
Origine00 0.0015  0.0015 
 (1.33)  (1.31) 
Race00 -0.0028  -0.0046 
 (-0.23)  (-0.38) 
PopDens00 0.0008  0.0007 
 (0.82)  (0.66) 
ChildInFam00 -0.0317  -0.0300 
 (-3.05) *** (-2.91) *** 
Urban00 -0.0048  -0.0046 
 (-1.43)  (-1.38) 
Gini00 0.0166  0.0230 
 (1.29)  (1.75) * 
HomeValue00 -0.0080  -0.0061 
 (-1.96) * (-1.44) 
HighSchool00 0.0249  0.0227 
 (2.77) *** (2.54) ** 
R-Square  0.81 0.81 
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Table 6: The Effect of Branch Presence on the Foreclosure Rates: Distance Adjusted to 1 Mile – 
OLS and GMM Estimates 
 
This table shows the effect of various measures of bank branch presence in 2000, BAccess00W, 1M, 
SBAccess00W, 1M, and LBAccess00W, 1M on county foreclosure rates by estimating the following 
regressions with OLS (Panel A): 
 
M_Foreclose  = f (BAccess00W, 1M, Income00, BAccess00W, 1M x Income00, X1)+ εF 
 
M_ Foreclose = f (SBAccess00W, 1M, LBAccess00W, 1M, Income00, SBAccess00W, 1M x Income00, 
LBAccess00W, 1M x Income00, X1)+ εF 
 
where X1 is a vector of control variables.  M_Foreclose is the mean foreclosure rate over the 6-year 
period.  BAccess00W, 1M, SBAccess00W, 1M, and LBAccess00W, 1M are as defined in (2) using the 
alternative branch-access variable in (1’). 
 
Panel B shows the GMM estimates from the following systems: 
Spread04= f (Z1990, Z2000, Foreclose04, X2)+ εS 
Foreclose04 = f (BAccess00W, 1M, BAccess00W, 1M x Income00, Spread04, Foreclose99, Z2000, X2)+ εF 
and 
Spread04= f (Z1990, Z2000, Foreclose04, X2)+ εS 
Foreclose04 = f (SBAccess00W, 1M, LBAccess00W, 1M, SBAccess00W, 1M x Income00, 
LBAccess00W, 1M x Income00, Spread04, Foreclose99, Z2000, X2)+ εF 
R-square is the squared-correlation of the observed endogenous variable with its predicted value. 
 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
(***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A – OLS Estimates 
 
 
  M_Foreclose 
BAccess00W, 1M -0.2730   
 (-0.65)   
BAccess00W, 1M x Income00  0.0255   
 (0.65)   
SBAccess00W, 1M   -1.3872 
   (-2.39) **
SBAccess00W, 1M x Income00    0.1316 
   (2.40) ** 
LBAccess00W, 1M   0.5289 
   (1.03) 
LBAccess00W, 1M x Income00    -0.0506 
   (-1.05) 










  Foreclose04 
BAccess00W, 1M -7.2004   
 (-1.87) *  
BAccess00W, 1M  x Income00  0.6760   
 (1.87) *  
SBAccess00W, 1M   -12.6748
   (-2.27) **
SBAccess00W, 1M  x Income00    1.1962 
   (2.27) ** 
LBAccess00W, 1M   -4.6806 
   (-0.97) 
LBAccess00W, 1M  x Income00    0.4357 
   (0.96) 
R-Square 0.44  0.49   36
 Table 7: The Effect of Branch Presence on the Foreclosure Rates: Disregarding Distance – 
OLS Estimates 
 
This table shows the effect of bank branch presence in 2000, BAccess00W, ND, on county foreclosure 
rates by estimating the following regression with OLS (Panel A): 
 
M_Foreclose = f (BAccess00W, ND, Income00, BAccess00W, ND x Income00, X1)+ εF 
 
where BAccess00W, ND is the inverse-income weighted average of the number of bank branches 
within 10-mile radius of each local market, irrespective of their distance to the census tract,  X1 is 
a vector of control variables, M_Foreclose is the mean foreclosure rate over the 6-year period. 
 
I also estimate the following system using GMM (Panel B): 
Spread04= f (Z1990, Z2000, Foreclose04, X2)+ εS 
Foreclose04 = f (BAccess00W, ND, BAccess00W, ND x Income00, Spread04, Foreclose99, Z2000, X2)+ εF 
Panel C tests the hypothesis that BAccess00W is a superior measure compared to BAccess00W, ND. 
 
The regressions that include SBAccess00W, ND and LBAccess00W, ND are estimated similarly. 
 
t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
 
(***), (**), and (*) denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Panel A – OLS Estimates 
 
  M_Foreclose 
BAccess00W, ND -0.1085   
 (-1.29)   
BAccess00W, ND x Income00  0.0098   
 (1.26)   
SBAccess00W, ND   -0.4793 
   (-3.33) *** 
SBAccess00W, ND x Income00    0.0453 
   (3.32) *** 
LBAccess00W, ND   0.1252 
   (1.10) 
LBAccess00W, ND x Income00    -0.0122 
   (-1.16) 
R-Square 0.80  0.81 
 




Panel C – BAccess00W vs. BAccess00W, ND 
 
  M_Foreclose - OLS    Foreclose04 - GMM 
BAccess00W  -0.3482    -2.4369  
  (-1.86) *      (-1.77) *   
BAccess00W x Income00  0.0335      0.2324   
  (1.89) *      (1.79) *   
BAccess00W, ND -0.1293      -0.9839   
 (-1.41)      (-1.25)   
BAccess00W, ND x Income00  0.0116      0.0903   
 (1.36)      (1.22)   
SBAccess00W   -0.4426      -4.0784 
   (-2.40) **     (-1.31) 
SBAccess00W x Income00    0.0414      0.3833 
   (2.38) **     (1.31) 
SBAccess00W, ND   -0.1910      4.1676 
   (-0.66)      (0.67) 
SBAccess00W, ND x Income00    0.0187      -0.3946 
   (0.68)      (-0.66) 
R-Square 0.82  0.83    0.59  0.46 
 
  Foreclose04 
BAccess00W, ND -0.7637   
 (-2.08) **  
BAccess00W, ND  x Income00  0.0699   
 (2.06) **  
SBAccess00W, ND   -3.2825 
   (-2.15) ** 
SBAccess00W, ND  x Income00    0.3096 
   (2.14) ** 
LBAccess00W, ND   -0.2684 
   (-0.36) 
LBAccess00W, ND  x Income00    0.0220 
   (0.31) 
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